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A BALANCING ACT: MODERN 
EQUALITY VS TRADITIONAL NOBILITY 
IN TONGA 
Tim René Salomon∗ 
The article examines the treatment of commoners and nobles under the Tongan Constitution and 
ordinary legislation.  This paper argues that Tonga fails to meet internationally acknowledged 
equality standards because "Tongan culture clashes head-on with basic human rights 
requirements".  The article provides some suggestions how to achieve a balance between upholding 
Tongan culture and traditions and complying with internationally accepted equality standards. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, riots in Nuku'alofa1 shocked the Tongan population and people all over the world with 
a connection to the Kingdom of Tonga. The seemingly sudden outburst of violence stands in 
contrast to the islands otherwise known as the "friendly Islands".2 However, Professor I F Helu 
foresaw such a development as early as 1992, when he stated at the Convention on Tongan 
Constitution and Democracy3:4 
If they are left to take their own course, there may be long periods where there are only a few 
insignificant changes taking place, but when real change does come, it will do so, more often than not, 
with violent and explosive fury, and even if desired goals are achieved, it will certainly effect extensive 
  
∗  LLB, Bucerius Law School, Hamburg, Germany. The author is specialising in the field of public 
international law and European law. The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Annelen Micus, 
LLB; James Faulkner LLB, MA; Marion Struck-Garbe, Dipl. Sozialwirtin; Patisepa Helu; Melanie 
Piédavent; Julie McKee; Via Atiola and Benjamin Kuhn for their kind suggestions and encouragement. 
1  Coverage at www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0611/S00331.htm (accessed 23 December 2008). 
2  www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tn.html (accessed 15 December 2008). 
3  Convention on Tongan Constitution and Democracy, Nuku'alofa, Tonga, 24-27 November 1992 
[Constitutional Convention]. 
4  I F Helu "Why change and change what?" in Report on the Constitutional Convention (Nuku'alofa, 1992) 86 
available at www.planet-tonga.com/HRDMT/Pdf_Files/Konivesio92.pdf (accessed 24 December 2008). 
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destruction to property and lives and such social damage that would cost immense resources to redress. 
Both the French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution are examples of the lack of foresight and the 
absence of the will to dialogue and plan sociopolitical change. 
Since the riots, the people of Tonga have been seeking a solution to issues that are now more 
pressing than ever. People's Representative (PR) Edwards among other PRs, who has recently been 
re-elected, is defending himself before the Tongan Supreme Court for his alleged participation in the 
riots, which mainly consisted of talking to the people he is representing.5 The crime he allegedly 
committed – sedition6 – includes speaking words that are expressive of the intention to excite 
disaffection against the King of Tonga or against the Parliament, the Legislative Assembly or the 
Judiciary in Tonga.7 The broad application of the sedition provision and its extremely vague 
wording ("disaffection") severely limits public expression of opinion and seems outdated. These 
charges are closely connected to the work of Clive Edwards and the conflict between the 
commoners and nobles, which is rooted in the perceived inequality between both.  
This article will outline the legal differences between "nobles" and "commoners" and examine 
the justifiability of those distinctions under international law. It will show that the current Tongan 
system falls short of ensuring internationally acknowledged equality standards, due to the fact that 
"Tongan culture clashes head-on with basic human rights requirements".8 The Tongan Government 
and ultimately its monarch are under an obligation under international law to provide for equality 
among the citizens of Tonga. This article attempts to provide suggestions for the transitional period 
of the implementation of reforms as recently pronounced by the King.9  
  
5  www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=38376 (accessed 15 of December 2008). 
6  Tongan Criminal Offences Act arts 47 and 48 [TCOA].  
7  Similar definitions can be traced back to the 1630s to 1640s: see Roger B Manning "The Origins of the 
Doctrine of Sedition" in Albion 12:2 (1980) 100-101, when it was used during the First English Civil War 
to silence separatists. See also Richard Overton An Alarum to the House of Lords against their Insolent 
Ursurpation of the Common Liberties (1646) 8. The punishment under Tongan law is a maximum of seven 
years imprisonment. In addition to the sentence, a conviction for sedition with a prison term of two or more 
years results in the deprivation of the offender's "right as a citizen" and of his right to hold an appointment 
in the public service and vote in an election according to Article 49 of the TCOA. It can only be hoped that 
the judiciary again upholds human rights, as Judge Finnegan stated: "It is not shown to my satisfaction that 
the accused actually said that ("the King is a dictator"). But if he did then, in their context those words can 
only mean, "the King is an authoritarian ruler who ignores my repeated requests for accountability by 
Himself and his Ministers"... if he said this, it appears to me to be the truth." King v Pohiva Supreme Court 
of Tonga (1998) cited in S Akilisi Pohiva "Media, Justice in Tonga" (2002) 8 Pacific Journalism Review 96, 
100. 
8  I F Helu Critical Essays – Cultural Perspectives from the South Seas (Journal of Pacific History, Canberra, 
1999) 33.  
9  Declaration from the Office of the Prime Minister Nuku'alofa (28 July 2008) available at 
www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0807/S00827.htm (accessed 24 December 2008). 
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The first part of the article outlines privileges of nobles in Tongan domestic law. After this, the 
traditional concept of nobility in Tonga is then described to ascertain the origin of this inequality. 
The third part examines equality rights, their status in international law and Tonga's obligations. In 
conclusion, suggestions towards a solution are sought. 
II INEQUALITY OF NOBLES AND COMMONERS IN TONGAN 
LEGISLATION 
The following section will show that there is unequal treatment of commoners and nobles under 
the current Tongan legislation. For the purposes of this article, the Constitution of Tonga is the main 
object of the examination. Article 3 of the Constitution is of central importance when focussing on 
equality and social structure. It proclaims: 
There shall be but one law in Tonga for chiefs and commoners for non-Tongans and Tongans. No laws 
shall be enacted for one class and not for another class but the law shall be the same for all the people of 
this land. 
Article 82, which used to give the Chief Justice the power to suspend laws inconsistent with the 
Constitution, was replaced in 1990 by the new article 82 declaring:  
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Kingdom and if any other law is inconsistent with this 
Constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
In theory, this would mean that every piece of legislation that allows inequality between nobles 
and commoners is void and without any effect. However, the Constitution itself provides for such 
inequality. Article 32 regulates succession to the throne and establishes that "if there should be no 
lawful heir the King shall appoint his heir if the House of Nobles consent to it." This provision goes 
on to explicitly state that "the representatives of the people … [have] no voice in the matter". 
Choosing the King or Queen in a monarchic system that assigns a significant amount of power to 
the monarch is a vital right, which carries enormous weight. Nobles also have the right under Article 
32 to "choose by ballot some one of the chiefs whom they wish to succeed as King" if there is no 
heir to the Crown. The People's Representatives have no right of participation in this matter either. 
When read together with Articles 41, 49, 67 and 79, the legal effect of these provisions is that nobles 
can in certain circumstances determine the person who will become King, who then "is immune 
from impeachment under a charter that cannot be changed without his consent".10 This constitutes a 
severe distinction between nobles and commoners, granting nobles a significant advantage in power. 
Article 60 of the Constitution stipulates:  
  
10  Rev Siupeli Taliai "The Constitution of Tonga from a Christian perspective" in Report on the Constitutional 
Convention, above n 4, 82.  
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There shall be elected by the nobles of the Kingdom from their number nine nobles as representatives of 
the nobles and there shall be elected by electors duly qualified nine representatives of the people. 
This constitutes another distinction between nobles and commoners, although at first sight there 
is seemingly equal treatment between nobles and commoners. The unjustified equal treatment of 
situations that are inherently different can also amount to discrimination. Here the privilege of the 
nobles lies in the fact that they are granted a higher percentage of representatives compared to the 
common people, who, despite overwhelmingly outnumbering the nobles (33 is the total number of 
hereditary nobles electing their nine representatives, compared to around 119,000 commoners),11 
are represented by an equal number of representatives. 
Other examples for privileges of nobility are articles 67 and 71. Article 67 is headed "Privilege 
of nobles" and gives only nobles the right to discuss or vote upon laws "relating to the King or the 
Royal Family or the titles and inheritances of the nobles." Article 71 excludes the participation of 
People's Representatives in trials judging over facts that allow depriving a "noble of his seat" in the 
Legislative Assembly.  
Moreover, there is inequality concerning land distribution. Article 104 of the Constitution 
allows only nobles, titular chiefs or matapules (leaders of lower rank) to own hereditary estates. Sale 
of land is not permitted; however, hereditary estates can be leased. Although 16-year-old male 
Tongans are entitled to an allotment of land,12 they must in practice obtain the estate holder's 
consent before the application for a plot of land can be considered by the Minister of Lands.13 
While this process may be comparatively easy for government-owned land most of which is, 
however, already occupied, it is more cumbersome for hereditary estates (tofi'a), which nobles 
own.14 In practice, the applicant has to prepare the way to the estate holder's consent with gifts and 
in some cases even money.15 Yet still the estate holder has the power of delaying the registration, 
which has been done in many cases for "reasons of power and personal advantage".16 This 
provision maintains the nobles as landlords over those who live on their estates.17 The different 
  
11  Ibid, 83. 
12  Tongan Land Act, s 43(1). Allocation to each qualified person has been impossible since 1981 due to land 
shortage. See Elizabeth Bott "Power and Rank in Tonga" (1981) 90(1) Journal of the Polynesian Society 7, 
70. 
13  Report on the Constitutional Convention, above n 4, 157.  
14  Tongan Land Act, s 9; Sione Latukefu "History of the Tongan Constitution" Report on the Constitutional 
Convention, above n 4. 
15  Ron Crocombe Land Tenure in the Pacific (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1971) 114. 
16  Ibid.  
17  Report on the Constitutional Convention, above n 4, 157. 
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tment of nobles and commoners regarding land ownership leads to severe inequalities between 
the two groups.  
Furthermore, other legislation such as the Defamation Act (article 4 for nobles and other 
dignitaries and Article 5 for other persons) distinguish between nobles and commoners and award 
higher protection for nobles by introducing harsher sentences for defamation of such dignitaries. 
Thus, there are pronounced distinctions betwee
hiera y of legislation. In order to explain these dif
organisation in Tonga and its historical origins.   
SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN TONGA 
A Historical Theories on the Early Beginnings 
Many different theories claim to have found the answer to the heritage of the Polynesian people. 
It is safe to assume that the Polynesian people were skilful navigators and arrived on the islands 
from the west about 3,500 years ago.18 The theory argued by Williamson seems to be a well-
founded description of the origin of the current social organisation.19 Arriving on the islands, the 
social organisation of these survivors was divided in family groupings.20 As family units became 
larger, fissions shaped social organisation. Some groups became dominant over others through 
given factors such as unequal distribution of fertile lands and food-supply as well as through inter-
group rivalry. Resulting from this process, the dominant group sought to maintain and strengthen 
their status by building alliances. Power became centralised in single persons – headmen of family 
units became chiefs. Through alliances an even higher social rank, head-chief, was formed. 
Consequently, the area controlled by one person gained in size. At the same time, social etiquette 
and forms of taboo arose in connection to the chiefs and they were as
estors the people believed in. This elevated chiefs to a high political, spiritual and sacr
ition. Essentially, chiefs were seen as different beings to commoners:21 
Pulotu was the place where the chiefs' souls went after they died… The commoners … had no souls. 
They were commonly referred to, even today, as the "kainanga-e-fonua" or the "eaters of the soil". 
 
18  Ian C Campbell Island Kingdom: Tonga Ancient and Modern (Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 
1992) 1; Anton Ernst Oldofredi Das Südsee-Königreich Tonga (Freiburg, 1975) 41. 
19  Robert W Williamson Essays in Polynesian Ethnology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1939) 
206. 
20  The following theory was developed by Williamson, ibid, 206-207. He relies on Handy "Problems of 
Polynesian Origin" (1924) 15 Bishop Museum Bulletin 7. 
21  Taliai, above n 10, 79. 
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his power and authority from heaven.22 Helu speaks of the time from the 8th until the 14th century 
AD in Tonga as a settled, centralised form and refers to this time as "pax Tongana".23  
The chiefs exercised multiple functions.24 Economically, they controlled production and land as 
well as the labour and tribute given to them by the people. Furthermore, the chiefs were ceremonial 
leaders and the people's material connection to the gods. They administered resources, carried 
judicial duties and kept control of inter-tribal affairs. This centralised leadership fostered a proper 
distribution of resources and minimised disputes. However, the people had to accept social 
inferiority as well as etiquette restrictions. They were obliged to supply the chief with resources and 
were in danger of becoming subjected to tyranny.  
Around the time of the thirteenth century, the highest chief became accepted to the extent that a 
challenge was unacceptable. Before this change, legend has it that Tu'itātui, the builder of the 
Ha'amonga25 and eleventh Tu'i Tonga (title of the early Tongan King, while the first is said to have 
been the son of the god Tangaloa Eitumatupu'a26 stood with his back to a stone, "swinging a stout 
stick at knee level when addressing his chiefs",27 in order to protect himself from possible attacks. 
Over the generations, the rule of chiefs was cemented by the sanctity of chieftainship and the 
traditional definitions and order of ranks. Furthermore, educational as well as material inequalities 
favoured the position of a chiefly family in comparison to commoners.28  
The resulting social structure of personal authority and rank is reflected in the modern Tongan 
language. It supplies the King with a separate register of speech, factually an independent language 
with different vocabulary, which most commoners are unable to understand. In between the regal 
register of the King and the ordinary register for commoners, there is an honorific register for chiefs, 
which mirrors the social ranks: aristocracy (hou'eiki), chiefs (mu'a eiki) and commoners (tu'a).29 To 
use the example chosen by Churchward, the ordinary word for "to eat" is kai, whereas the honorific 
word used in communication with chiefs and holders of high offices is 'ilo, while the regal word 
  
22  Campbell, above n 18, 13. 
23  I F Helu "Democracy bug bites Tonga" in Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific (University of the 
South Pacific, Suva, 1992) 139. 
24  For a concise list of advantages and disadvantages for chiefs and the people see Williamson, above n 19, 
208.  
25  A trilithon on Tongatapu. 
26  Taliai, above n 10, 79. 
27  Campbell, above n 18, 9. 
28  Williamson, above n 19, 208. 
29  Campbell, above n 18, 8. 
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used referring to a god or the king is taumafa.30 This solidifies the current social structure, making 
it impossible to abolish without attacking cultural fundamentals. In modern Tonga, the prevalent 
knowledge of the English language, which is taught parallel to Tongan in high schools, may help to 
alleviate this effect. 
A challenge of this structure by commoners seemed unlikely over a long period of time, as 
submissiveness and humility of the commoners became a source of identity and pride31 and 
extended into smaller social units. The head of a family made important decisions about marriages 
and land allocation, still being subordinated to a person of higher rank. This shows that the concept 
of rank even among commoners was such a part of the Tongan identity that acceptance of chiefs 
was no longer in question.  
The rank of the chiefs themselves was determined by many factors among them being age, order 
of birth and the degree of tapu, which depended on the distance of the relationship of the chief to the 
first Tu'i Tonga and as such to the divinity of the god Tangaloa 'Eitumatupu'a. The status was, 
however, not only determined by birth-given characteristics. The mana of a chief was believed to be 
granted by gods and expressed the favour of the god towards the chief. It was expressed by his 
qualities and actions. A definition is not entirely agreed upon among scholars, but it includes a 
supernatural component.32 Bravery, success, intelligence, strength and wisdom among other 
qualities showed that the chief was favoured by the god, which in turn affected how the chief was 
regarded. The Tongan system incorporated the two basic ideas of leadership predominant in the 
Pacific – the "big man" system, which is competitive and includes choosing the leader by personal 
qualities and the "chiefly" system, which is based on genealogical entitlement.33 While the latter 
dominates the Tongan tradition, the concept of mana proves that personal qualities had a strong 
influence on the chief's social position. 
B Limits to Chiefly Power 
The traditional chiefly organisation served its purpose for some time, but between 1777 and 
1820 a civil war arose as a consequence of conflicts between the chiefs.34 Ultimately, however, the 
ascendancy of Taufa'ahau, a Christian convert, ended these struggles. Taufa'ahau, who was baptised 
in 1831 as Siaosi,35 proclaimed the Vava'u Code in 1839 in Ha'apai and Vava'u, which he ruled 
over during that time. This code put into practice Christian rules (for example the prohibition of 
  
30  Clerk Maxwell Churchward Tongan Grammar (Oxford University Press, London, 1953) 304. 
31  Campbell, above n 18, 26. 
32  Richard Feinberg "Elements of Leadership in Oceania" (2002) 12:1 Anthropological Forum 9, 15. 
33  The two systems are defined in Feinberg, ibid, 11. 
34  Campbell, above n 18, 37. 
35  Siaosi is the Tongan form of the name George. 
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work on the Sabbath), but also set an early limit to chiefly power. Judges were appointed to decide 
on criminal offences and the punishment thereof, which was formerly a responsibility of the 
chiefs.36 The Vava'u Code also included the idea of equality, as the subjects of this law were to be 
treated equally by the judges.37  
 
In 1845, Taufa'ahau, from then on known as Tupou I, was proclaimed Tu'i Kanokupolu and 
united the power over all of Tonga in one person, establishing his supremacy 1850 with the Code of 
Law for all Tongans.38 This newly proclaimed Code included the prohibition of common crimes, 
but more importantly set limits to chiefly power. It limited political power to chiefs, who had 
authority to govern, while disempowering mere chiefs by birth.39 Furthermore, chiefs had to obey 
the same law as commoners.  
In 1862, a further code of law was proclaimed. It included the Emancipation Edict, abolishing 
all chiefly authority over the people. The chief's right to the property of their commoners was 
abolished40 so that commoners and chiefs were to have "the same legal rights in all respects".41 The 
Constitution followed in 1875 and swept away the last legal vestiges of traditional chieftainship by 
establishing a new aristocracy and thus transforming chieftainship to kingship.42 This Constitution 
is – in amended form – still in force today. Although chieftainship was abolished, the newly 
proclaimed aristocracy was composed of selected former chiefs, in an attempt to settle the ongoing 
conflicts over power and appease the most powerful chiefs in Tonga.43  
Thus, aristocracy was established to keep the peace between the King and the former chiefs, 
which would have otherwise been without any authority. As outlined above, certain class 
differences are deeply rooted in Tongan history. The privileges of nobles in current legislation 
reflect these distinctions and perpetuate the traditional privileges of chiefs into Tongan's modern day 
aristocracy. 
 
36  Campbell, above n 18, 64. 
37  Oldofredi, above n 18, 82. 
38  Taliai, above n 10, 79. 
39  Campbell, above n 18, 65. 
40  Ibid, 69. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid, 78. 
43  George Marcus The Nobility and the Chiefly Tradition in the Kingdom of Tonga (The Polynesian Society, 
Wellington, 1980) 37. 
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IV TONGA'S OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT EQUALITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
Having established that current Tongan legislation privileges nobles over commoners, it will be 
examined against which standards the different treatment of nobles and commoners is to be 
measured in public international law. Thus, in this section, the international human rights standard 
for equality, in so far it poses obligations on Tonga, will be assessed. The origin of equality as a 
political concept as well as the current legal situation will be illustrated. It will be shown that 
equality and non-discrimination are foundation stones of human rights development and bind Tonga 
by forming part of customary international law and ius cogens.44  
The principle of equality is part of most human rights treaties. However, it is in itself an 
extremely broad concept, which can be applied to every possible circumstance giving rise to a 
different factual or theoretical treatment. In order to understand how a certain cultural fact conflicts 
with this concept, a more precise definition has to be established. Such a definition starts with a 
brief look at the roots of the concept.  
A Historical Background of the Concept of Equality 
The concept of equality in a legal and political sense can be traced back to antique writers and 
philosophers. Cicero argued in his work De Re Publica45 that liberty can only exist where it is 
equally available to everyone. This was reiterated by Rousseau, who elaborated on equality and 
distinguished two aspects of inequality: natural inequality46 and political inequality, which 
"depends on a kind of convention, and is established, or at least authorised by the consent of 
me
development.48 The principle of equality has subsequently been transformed from binding only the 
 
n".47   
Traces of the evolved concept of equality can be found in all cornerstones of human rights 
 
Latin for "compelling law". To norms of ius coge44  ns no derogation is under any circumstances permitted, 
on is only possible by a subsequent norm of ius cogens. See also 
45  
46   by nature, and consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, 
e qualities of the mind or of the soul": Rousseau A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation of the 
47  
48  
protection of the laws was included in the 14th Amendment 
such norms bind all states and a modificati
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 53. 
Cicero De Re Publica Liber I, 47. 
The inequality which is "established
and th
Inequality of Mankind (1754) ch 1. 
Ibid.  
The Magna Carta (1215) included in ch 40 the provision "to no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or 
delay right or justice", referring to equal access to justice and equal protection of the law. The Déclaration 
des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (1789) provided in Art 1 that all "men are born and remain free and 
equal in rights". The Virginia Bill of Rights (1776) stated in s 1 that "all men are by nature equally free and 
independent". Moreover, the principle of equal 
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judiciary to a substantive guarantee that also binds the legislature.49 Thus, equality is a judicial and 
legislative guarantee for citizens and this interpretation of equality is deeply rooted at least within 
western legal tradition. 
B Equality Under International Law Today 
To examine the content of the notion of equality in international law, international and regional 
instruments of human rights protection have to be analysed. After a short overview over 
international instruments that protect equality, regional ones will be briefly discussed. Both 
international and regional instruments set the foundation for customary international law, which will 
be regarded in the final part of this section.  
1 International instruments of protection 
Focussing on an international norm of equality, the net of protection tends to be less intricate 
than for regional ones such as the European system, as there is more diversity of interests among a 
greater number of states and consensus is usually reached on the lowest common denominator.  
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)50 establishes equality rights in Article 1: 
"[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights"; Article 2: "[e]veryone is entitled 
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind" and 
article 7: "[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of 
this Declaration…" Thus the ideas of equality before and equal protection of the law, as well as an 
accessory right to non-discrimination,51 are included in the UDHR.  
3 The United Nations Charter, Twin Covenants and other Conventions 
The Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter)52 itself is silent on specific human rights, since 
a catalogue of human rights could not be agreed upon at the time of the Charter's formation.53 Only 
  
to the United States Constitution (1868) establishing that "no state … shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". 
49  Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Engel, Kehl, 1993) Art 
26 n 2.  
50  Universal Declaration on Human Rights (10 December 1948) UN Doc GA/Res/217A (III) [UDHR]. 
51  An accessory right is a right to non-discrimination, which is not absolute, but relative to other human rights 
guarantees.  
52  Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 1 UNTS 16. 
53  Bruno Simma The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Munich, 
2002) 35. 
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minor links to human rights can be found, a shortcoming that was later remedied by the Twin 
Covenants.54 However, even in the UN Charter, despite ideological discrepancies, it was agreed to 
mention equ 55
 rights and for 
 Rights (ICESCR)57 also contain clauses guaranteeing 
equality
age, religion, 
ncepts: equality before the 
law
ality as a purpose of the Charter:  
To achieve international co-operation in … promoting and encouraging respect for human
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. … 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)56 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
. Article 26 of the ICCPR provides: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of 
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, langu
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
The provision has been construed to be a general prohibition of discrimination58 and thus 
effectively absorbs ICCPR article 2(1), which provides merely for an accessory right to equality.59 
Article 26 of the ICCPR includes three different and distinct equality co
, equal protection of the law and protection against discrimination.60 
Articles 2.2 and 3 of the ICESCR contain accessory non-discrimination clauses and mention 
equality in a number of provisions with specific association. The principle of non-discrimination is 
also the underlying principle of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
  
The Twin Covenants are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 
UNTS 171 [ICCPR] and the Inter
54  
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 
Nations, above n 52, Art 1.3.  
58  
enschenrechtsschutz 165 (2003) Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen 
cht 149, 152. 
60  , ERG, 
1966) 993 UNTS 3 [ICESCR]. 
55  Charter of the United 
56  ICCPR, above n 54. 
57  ICESCR, above n 54.  
CCPR General Comment 18 (1989) No 12. This has been clarified after a lengthy scholarly discussion by 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Broeks v Netherlands Yearbook of the Human Rights 
Committee 1987 Vol. II 193 and Zwaan-de Vries v Netherlands Yearbook of the Human Rights Committee 
1987 Vol. II 300. After these cases, Art 26 was treated "in isolation from the rest of the Covenant" and no 
longer "in conjunction with other rights of the Covenant". See Pierre-Marie Dupuy "Equality under the 1966 
Covenants and in the 1948 Declaration" in Wolfrum et al Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung im 
nationalen und internationalen M
Recht und Völkerre
59  Dupuy, ibid, 155. 
See also Torkel Opsahl "Equality in Human Rights Law" Festschrift Felix Ermacora (Kehl am Rhein
NP Engel Verlag, 1988) 51-52, who calls the equality focus of the ICCPR an "overkill" in emphasis. 
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Discrimination (CERD)61 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW),62 as well as other conventions of the UN and the International Labour 
4  
mented in member 
stat
 the ECHR includes a general prohibition of 
 
Organization.63 
European instruments of protection 
In the latest legislative development of the concept of equality, the reach of the guarantee of 
equality has been increased, by expanding prohibited reasons for discrimination. An almost 
universal concept of non-discrimination is developing in European Union law, where the Racial 
Equality Directive64 and the Employment Equality Directive65 have been imple
es, most of them going beyond the protection demanded by the directives.66  
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR)67 includes an accessory right to equality in Article 14, ensuring a right to non-
discriminatory treatment only in connection with the rights and freedoms of the Convention. 
However, the twelfth Optional Protocol to
discrimination.  
 
62  he Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (18 December 1979) 1249 
63  
ional Human Rights Law and EU Law (Helsinki, 2005). 
66  
 "Historische und ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung des Gleichheitssatzes" in Wolfrum et al, 
61  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (21 December 1965) 660 UNTS 195. 
Convention on t
UNTS 13.  
For an analysis of treaties including the principle of equality and non-discrimination see Timo Makkonen 
The Principle of Non-Discrimination in Internat
64  Council Directive 2000/43/EC (29 June 2000). 
65  Council Directive 2000/78/EC (27 November 2000). 
Mark Bell and Janet Cormack Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe (Migration Policy Group, 
Utrecht, 2005) 8. The grounds for discrimination included in the directives are racial and ethnic origin, 
religion and belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. Other grounds are already accepted under EU law. 
In addition to this broad spectrum of possible grounds for discrimination, all national laws have to be 
interpreted "in the light of the wording and purpose of the Directive" (Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann 
v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891) by national courts. This trend to increasingly effective 
protection against inequalities has departed from the former basis of eliminating the supremacy of one class 
for the common good. Equality is now enforced in a finely spun web of discriminatory grounds and 
methods. This is problematic on its own, as the finer equality is applied, the higher the sensibility for 
remaining inequalities is, so that the principle's application in itself carries a danger of trivialisation. 
Michael Stolleis
above n 58, 21. 
67  European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 222. 
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C Other Regional Instruments of Protection 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)68 states: "[a]ll persons are equal before 
the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law."69 
Equality also is ensured for specific circumstances in Articles 8(2), 17(4), 17(5), 23(1.b) and 
23(1.c). The guarantee of equality in the ACHR is not limited to an accessory guarantee. The 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights,70 also known as the Banjul Charter, echoes Article 
24 ACHR in Article 3 and introduces in Article 2 an accessory right to equality, binding equality to 
the "rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter". Furthermore, it includes 
an open catalogue of prohibited grounds for discrimination, including "national and social origin," 
"birth" and "other status". The not yet binding Charter of the Arab League 1945 also includes a 
equality in Article 2. In Article 9, it guarantees 
equ
l 
bar
w
international law by opinio juris.74 It binds all states whether or not they accepted an obligation.75  
 
similar provision establishing an accessory right to 
ality before the law and a right to legal remedy. In addition, it mentions equality in the Preamble 
and in Article 32 guaranteeing equality of opportunity "in regard to work". 
D Customary International Law and Ius Cogens 
It has been shown that there is a universal acceptance of equality, which transcends ideologica
riers, as can be seen by its implementation in all regional human rights treaties. Moreover, it has 
been shown that it forms part of all comprehensive international human rights treaties. This is a 
strong suggestion for customary international law. In the following this status will be confirmed.  
Although the UDHR was intended to be a declaration which "does not purport to be a statement 
of law or of legal obligation",71 there is a tendency to give legal character to several of its 
provisions.72 The Montreal Assembly for Human Rights promoted as early as 1968 that the UDHR 
"constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order, and has over the years 
become a part of customary international law",73 Customary international law includes general 
principles of law, hich are carried by an equal pattern of state practice and accepted as customary 
 
NTS 143. 
70  TS 217.  
f United States representative at the time of UDHR adoption, reprinted in Lori F Damrosch et al 
72  
ional Commission of Jurists 94, 95. 
rt 38 (1.b); North Sea Continental Shelf Case ICJ Reports (1969) 3, 
68  American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) 1144 U
69  Ibid, Art 24.  
African Charter of Human Rights (27 June 1981) 1520 UN
71  Statement o
International Law (West Publishing, St. Paul, 2001) 593. 
Ibid, 594. 
73  "Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights 2" reprinted in (1968) 9:1 Journal of the 
Internat
74  Latin for "opinion of law"; ICJ Statute A
No 71. 
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While there is still scholarly disagreement on the extent to which the UDHR constitutes customary 
international law,76 the right of equality, as laid down in Article 2 of the UDHR forms part of that 
bod e 
Inter-American 
irth or any other status is unacceptable. … At the 
orms of general international law." 
To 
 
y of law and what is more can be considered to be ius cogens. This has been confirmed by th
Court of Human Rights in unequivocal terms:77 
This Court considers that the principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and 
non-discrimination belongs to ius cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international 
public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. Nowadays, no legal act 
that is in conflict with this fundamental principle is acceptable, and discriminatory treatment of any 
person, owing to … social origin … civil status, b
existing stage of the development of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-
discrimination has entered the realm of ius cogens. 
The ius cogens character is especially true for discrimination based on social class and birth 
including the distinction between nobles and commoners before the law, as there is an 
overwhelming uniformity in state practice accepting this as unlawful discrimination. Furthermore, it 
is at the core of equality, which dates back to the 18th century and has originally been "a hallmark of 
bourgeois thought… against privileges of nobility".78 Equal protection of the law and equality 
before the law, especially in a social class discrimination context, is, as Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties79 describes, a "peremptory n
a norm of ius cogens "no derogation is permitted and [it] can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character".80 
The equality aspects in question in Tonga are associated with other rights recognised under 
international law, such as the right of people to change their government,81 the right to own 
property,82 and the right to protection of one's honour.83 Thus, even if the ius cogens norm is 
 
76  
77   Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 
-American Court of Human Rights Ser. A 18 (2003) para 101; see also Maya 
 n 60, 51. 
80  
cting the King and the equal number of representatives for 
r of the nobles. 
83   
75  North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ibid. 
See Hailbronner in Vizthum et al Völkerrecht (Springer, Berlin, 2007) 231. 
"Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants"
(17 September 2003) Inter
Indigenous Community Case Inter-American Commission 12.053 para 4. 
78  Opsahl, above
79  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 33.  
Ibid, Art 53. 
81  See the privileges of nobles with regard to ele
both classes, leading to an imbalance of power in favou
82  See the factual differences for land ownership. 
See the differential protection in the Defamation Act.
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merely an accessory right to equality – which one might argue with reference to lack of uniform 
state practice evidenced by state protest84 against the broad interpretation of Article 26 of the 
 would be infringed by 
uality. Moreover, the Charter sets out the UN's aim to "promote and 
encourag
te – by customary international law and 
ius cogens
ICCPR by the United Nations Human Rights Committee85 – it
discriminatory treatment with regard to those rights. 
V THE EFFECT OF THESE PROVISIONS ON TONGA 
It has been set out above that equality as a human right is protected by the United Nations. In 
fact, it has been stated that the "United Nations Organization had been founded principally to 
combat discrimination in the world".86 Tonga joined the UN as a member state in 1999 and as such 
accepted the UN Charter and its purposes. A main purpose outlined in the UN Charter is the 
protection of human rights. Articles 1.3, 55(c) and 56 discuss this purpose and make explicit 
mention to the principle of eq
e respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion".87  
Furthermore, when Tonga was already a member of the UN, the Millennium Declaration88 was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly, affirming the aim of the organisation and its member states 
to adhere to human rights. However, the Millennium Declaration is not binding and imposes no 
direct legal obligation on the declaring states. The UN Charter, which is binding, does not explicitly 
outlaw discrimination on the basis of social status or birth. Tonga is neither a member of the ICCPR 
nor the ICESCR. Thus Tonga is not legally bound by any human rights treaty expressly giving the 
right of equality. However Tonga is bound – as is every sta
. It has been established that equality before the law and a right to non-discrimination 
based on social class and birth belong to this body of law.  
A right to equality "does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation 
based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination"89 where 
the aim pursued in drawing the distinction is legitimate and the means employed are not 
disproportionate.90 Upholding traditional and cultural values may be a legitimate aim of the Tongan 
  
84  See for example the (inadmissible) reservation of Germany in BGBl. 1994 II, 311 and the reservation by 
Switzerland in BGBl. 1993 II, 1998 (1999). 
85  See CCPR General Comment 18, above n 58. 
86  UN Doc A/C 3/ S.R 100, 7, cited in Warwick McKean Equality and Discrimination under International 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983) 59. 
87  UN Charter Arts 1.3 and 13.1.b. 
88  United Nations Millennium Declaration (8 September 2000) UN Doc. A/Res/55/2 (2000).  
89  Opsahl, above n 60, 62; see also Li Weiwei Equality and Non-Discrimination under International Human 
Rights Law (Ad Notam Gyldendal, Oslo, 2004) 9. 
90  Opsahl, above n 60, 55.  
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leg
. There is agreement that a state whose legislation is incompatible with binding 
inte
l nce with these norms can be challenged by every 
aw, regardless of a pre-existing treaty obligation.93 Furthermore, the 
obl
c ture is concerned human beings are never born equal 
in d
ke into consideration that a culture has a certain intrinsic 
 
islation. However the perpetuation of class distinction directly contradicts the equality principle. 
As such, there is no underlying legitimate aim for the legislation outlined above. The legislation 
privileging nobles is discriminatory and thus in contradiction to international law. 
Having established that Tonga is bound by a ius cogens norm protecting equality, which it 
infringes by perpetuating class privileges, Tonga's obligations to remedy this situation must be 
examined
rnational law is under an obligation to perform legislative acts that remedy such an 
incompatibility.91 Thus, Tonga is obliged to change the discriminatory legislation and reform its 
system.  
Moreover, ius cogens norms result in obligations erga omnes,92 which means that the obligation 
is incurred towards all states and non-comp ia
subject of public international l
igation is not limited to abolishing existing discriminatory legislation, but includes specific 
(affirmative) action to ensure future equality.94 
VI CONCLUSION 
Tongan legislation and social structure feature discriminatory inequalities, as is typical for 
stratified chiefdom societies. Thus, "Tongan culture clashes head-on with basic human rights 
requirements"95 because "as far as Tongan ul
ignity and rights because national and social origin, birth and wealth all feature in the social 
calculus that determines one's status…".96 However, duties under ius cogens have to be followed, 
even when they conflict with national laws.97  
How can this conflict be resolved? Will we rekindle the criticism against globally equal human 
rights standards as Western ideas and launch over Tonga a new mission, this time not Christian, but 
based on human rights? We will have to ta
 
91  Stephan Hobe and Otto Kimminich Einführung in das Völkerrecht (8 ed, A. Francke, Tübingen, 2004) 225 
– 227. 
92  Latin for "towards everyone". 
93  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (New Application) (Belgium v Spain) 1970 ICJ Rep 4 
(Judgment 5 February 1970); [1976] 2 YB International Law Commission pt 2, 99, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 (pt.2); Hobe and Kimminich, above n 91, 174. 
94  Nowak, above n 49; Opsahl, above n 60, 57-58; CCPR General Comment 3; CESR General Comment 3. 
95  Helu, above n 8, 33. 
96  Ibid, 35.  
97  Georg Dahm et al Völkerrecht, Band 1,1, Die Grundlagen. Die Völkerrechtssubjekte (Walter de Gruyter, 
Berlin, 1989) 103.  
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val
v yone. The right of progress cannot be denied to these 
cul nd 
hum on 
wit
e explanation given by those who 
rvival game. Each player – much like each 
gov
 concepts. Essentially, democracy will mean 
 
ue. It is one of humanity's greatest treasures to have diverse cultures and therewith an array of 
different ways of managing the common challenges of the environment and the everyday fight for 
survival. This diversity has to be upheld.  
A danger of the growing influence of international law is that it severely alters cultures and 
traditions in order to achieve the goal of universal rights. The originality of indigenous cultures, 
traditions and multifaceted lore has to be approached with caution, as contact will inevitably alter 
them severely. On the other hand, we cannot uphold the value of a culture at the cost of fundamental 
concepts that should be applicable to e er
tures, as this would mean to make the people of Tonga, who increasingly call for democracy a
an rights,98 mere objects in a bizarre museum of ethnology. It has been stated in connecti
h the Constitutional Convention that:99  
The overall effect [of the current legal system] is that Tonga has a class system in which the interests of 
the elite take precedence over those of the bulk of the population. Th
support the status quo is that Tonga has survived because it has had the same system for over a thousand 
years. … Under the guise of respect for traditions and the culture, those who benefit from the system 
turn a blind eye to corruption, nepotism, selfishness and favouritism. 
There is a difficult balance to maintain between preserving cultural traditions while 
universalising human rights, which are rooted in the inherent dignity of the human being. The 
situation can be compared to that of a strategic su
ernment – has different tactics, and makes independent choices that they deem right and fitting. 
Yet all have to abide by the same rules, which may limit them in their individuality, but also ensure 
that the game remains operable and enjoyable to all.  
The Tongan Government and ultimately its monarch are under an international legal obligation 
to provide for equality among the people of Tonga. It will be a significant task to reform the system, 
as it affects not only political rights but also social status and everyday life. This is where the 
individuality of one society begins and where the rules of the game end. The goal of equal rights and 
a society without a legally privileged class may also be achieved in a monarchy such as Tonga, 
especially since Tonga has taken significant steps towards more democracy in this current system. 
Ultimately, it will be the role of the Tongans and their progressive and conservative thinkers to self-
determine their political future and to decide if the monarchy should be upheld, maybe in a reduced 
form, or if a totally new and more democratic system has to be sought. More democratic systems 
may also find a solid foundation in traditional Tongan
 
98  This is evidenced by the Convention on Tongan Constitution and Democracy (1992) and the political 
speeches of the Human Rights and Democracy movement, whose candidates' agenda is to reform the 
system.  
99  Constitutional Convention, Appendix II, 157. See, above n 4, for full report. 
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turn
e 
stand towards human rights,101 the recent proclamation by Tupou V, in which he consents to reform 
the monarch's powers in favour of a more representative parliament102 and the planning of a new 
Constitutional Convention103 mark important steps towards reforms as suggested by the people. 
 
ing away from choosing leaders by birth and bloodlines, while turning to choosing leaders by 
the ancient concept of mana, meaning the choice of leaders by their qualities, such as bravery, 
intelligence, wisdom and success and by their actions. 
Concerning reforms, there is no lack of suggestions, as the Constitutional Convention has 
shown. In this Convention and subsequently in the drafts of the Basic Proposals for an alternative 
Structure of Government for Tonga100 sensitive suggestions have been made on how to balance 
culture and human rights. It is of great value that these suggestions come from within Tonga and 
they should be held in high esteem and deserve a great deal of attention. Tonga's overall cooperativ
 
100  Available at www.planet-tonga.com/HRDMT/Articles/HRDMT_Proposal/Proposal-English.shtml (accessed 
23 December 2008). 
101  As witnessed by the fact that Tonga was the first Pacific Island state to successfully complete the Universal 
Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, which started in April 2008. See UN Doc A/HRC/8/48 (5 
June 2008).  
102  Declaration from the Office of the Prime Minister Nuku'alofa, above n 9.  
103  www.pmo.gov.to/featured-news-multimedia-175/171-tongan-constitutional-convention-in-2009.html 
(accessed 24 December 2008). 
